Western New England Law Review
Volume 29 29 (2006-2007)
Issue 1 SYMPOSIUM: ISSUES IN COMMUNITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Article 8

1-1-2006

EMINENT DOMAIN: IN THE AFTERMATH
OF KELO V. NEW LONDON, A
RESURRECTION IN NORWOOD: ONE
PUBLIC INTEREST ATTORNEY'S VIEW
Patricia H. Lee

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Patricia H. Lee, EMINENT DOMAIN: IN THE AFTERMATH OF KELO V. NEW LONDON, A RESURRECTION IN NORWOOD:
ONE PUBLIC INTEREST ATTORNEY'S VIEW, 29 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 121 (2006), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/
lawreview/vol29/iss1/8

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New
England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

EMINENT DOMAIN: IN THE AFTERMATH
OF KELO V. NEW LONDON, A
RESURRECTION IN NORWOOD:
ONE PUBLIC INTEREST
ATTORNEY'S VIEW
PATRICIA

H.

LEE*

Too bad for Orlissie's Place, the Louisiana Southern Cuisine res
taurant that used to be at 529 Lake St. [The] [o]wner ... had
financial problems and it didn't help when [the city and the local]
High School moved to seize the property for creation of new ath
letic fields. . .. Orlissie's was family friendly. "Small orders of
macaroni and cheese, meat loaf and fried catfish ... bread pud
ding, and peach cobbler." We'll also miss the live jazz and blues
on Friday nights. 1
INTRODUCTION

Three months before residents of New London, Connecticut,
went to court in Kelo v. City of New London? I recall reading a side
note about a family distraught in a different town. 3 The family
* President and General Counsel, National Institute for Urban Entrepreneur
ship, Washington, D.C., and Maryland. The National Institute for Urban Entrepreneur
ship (NIUE) wrote an amici curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of
New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). See Welcome to NIUE, www.niueonline.org (last
visited Dec. 26, 2006). The NIUE was joined by the Better Government Association,
Citizen Advocacy Center, DKT Liberty Project, and the Office of the Community Law
yer. The NIUE, with the Ohio Conference of the NAACP, also filed a brief as amici
curiae in City of Norwood v. Gamble, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-0hio-3799, 853 N.E.2d
1115. The NIUE is a non-profit, non-partisan corporation that develops and imple
ments legal and entrepreneurship programs that support the growth of viable, sustaina
ble businesses by Blacks, Latinos, and other entrepreneurs of color. Further, it strives
to be a national catalyst for a culture of entrepreneurship, innovation, and private-sec
tor economic growth in urban communities.
1. Eric Linden, Villages Notice Increased Ridership on CTA El Lines, Oak Park J.
(Oak Park, Ill.), Aug. 7, 2000, http://suburbanjournals.comiStories99IDidYouKnow
past2.html (quoting a Chicago Magazine review by Jeanne Rattenbury).
2. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto I), No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS
789 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part, 843 A.2d 500 (2004),
affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3. Linden, supra note 1.
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friendly restaurant named Orlissie's, located in Oak Park, Illinois,
had succumbed to the threat of eminent domain. The unfortunate
news of a restaurant closing was more common, partly because of
the continued and disturbing increase in the number of eminent
domain acquisitions occurring across the country.4
As a public-interest attorneyS employed by one of the leading
defenders of entrepreneurs, small businesses, and homeowners, and
as former corporate counsel to a multinational corporation,6 I knew
that this would not be the last time a business or homeowner would
lose his or her property because of eminent domain. At the same
time, I believed that this was yet another horrific example of a busi
ness owner losing the battle over developing property to run a busi
ness, in the manner and in the location he or she chose. 7
Property owners, in dilemmas similar to that of the Oak Park
business owner, are not typically in a position to successfully defend
the taking of their private property.s The cause is as much a func
tion of the property owner's financial and political wherewithal to
chaUenge 9 even the threat of eminent domain, as it is the contempo
4. See generally DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIvE-YEAR,
STATE-By-STATE REPORT EXAMINING TIlE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), avail
able at http://www.castlecoalition.org!pdfJreportJED_report.pdf. "Eminent domain ...
means the power to take land and the process for taking it. The only difference be
tween condemnation and eminent domain is that the term condemnation is ... broader.
Eminent domain is not used to describe taking property that has numerous building
code violations or tax delinquency." Id. at 219.
5. During the period of July 1998 through July 2003, Ms. Lee was employed by
the Institute for Justice (IJ), a public interest law firm previously located in Washington,
D.C., now with offices in Arlington, Virginia. IJ operates the IJ Clinic on Entrepre
neurship at the University of Chicago, where Ms. Lee served as founding director from
1998-2002. From 2002-2003, Ms. Lee worked at IJ as Managing Vice-President and
National Director of Clinical Programs.
6. From March 1984 to May 1994, Ms. Lee was corporate counsel for McDonald's
Corp., a Dow 30 corporation with its United States headquarters in Oak Brook, Illinois.
7. BERLINER, supra note 4, at 2 (documenting "10,282+ filed or threatened con
demnations for private parties[,] 3,722+ properties with condemnations filed for the
benefit of private parties[,] 6,560+ properties threatened with condemnation for private
parties[,] 4,032+ properties currently living under threat of private use condemnation[,]
41 states with reports of actual or threatened condemnations for private parties[, and] 9
states with no reports of either actual or threatened private use condemnations").
8. See Posting of James D. Carmine to Blogcritics.org, http://blogcritics.org!
archives/2005109/211185426.php (Sept. 21, 2005) ("As Susette Kelo, painfully discov
ered, poor individuals are unable to afford the legal help necessary to win fair compen
sation from the mighty power of their local governments.").
9. Douglas W. Kmiec, Foreword, in BERLINER, supra note 4 ("The extent of this
abuse is widespread, but until recently, largely unaddressed-in part because isolated
landowners confronted with costly and cumbersome condemnation procedures seldom
have the legal or political wherewithal to stand against the winds of power.").
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rary presumption that eminent domain is, overall, beneficial. In
most cases, rather than considering the constitutional nuances and
factual distinctions in eminent-domain battles, the prevailing
thought is simply to question whether the taking of the home or
business owner's property would entitle the owner to "just compen
sation" and what amount of compensation a court would consider
"just. "
As unsettling as the Oak Park acquisition was to its commu
nity, as a matter of public policy, the taking of private property in
order to give it to another private party seems more unthinkable
and more egregious than the traditional taking for the benefit of the
public in the form of schools, highways, common carriers, and
roads.lO Perhaps predictably, polls evidence the widespread and
negative public reaction to the United States Supreme Court's deci
sion in the Kelo case. l l Online opinion polls found that respon
dents overwhelmingly disapproved of the ruling. 12 The public's
disapproval indicated that people believed the executive, legisla
tive, and judicial branches had gone too far in allowing eminent
domain takings of private property without a traditional public use.
This essay discusses Kelo, the public outcry following the opin
ion, and the resultant legal action across the country. Part I reviews
the history of the public use doctrine, while Part II discusses the
Supreme Court's decision in Kelo and the Court's determination
that economic development can be a public use. Part III discusses
the executive, legislative, and voter responses to Kelo. Part IV dis
cusses the case City of Norwood v. Horney, which was recently de
10. Linden, supra note 1 (discussing the local public school's desire to use the
Orlissie's Place site for expanded athletic fields).
11. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo III), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005); see, e.g.,
Castle Coalition, Inst. for Justice, The Polls Are In: Americans Overwhelmingly Op
pose Use of Eminent Domain for Private Gain [hereinafter "The Polls Are In"], http://
castlecoalition.org!resourceslkelo_polls.html (last visited Dec. 30,2006) (discussion of
the results of many public-opinion polls, and links to many of these polls); see also infra
note 12 (discussion of several online polls that asked individuals questions about emi
nent domain takings).
12. See, e.g., The Polls are In, supra note 11 (citing and discussing a number of
Internet polls held to gauge the public support for eminent domain takings, including:
CNN.com, QuickVote (click on the "Results" link) (reporting that 66 percent of survey
participants selected "never" in response to the survey prompt: "Local governments
should be able to seize homes and businesses"); MSNBC.com, Live Vote (click on the
"Results" link) (reporting that 97 percent of respondents answered "No, property own
ers will lose and developers gain" to the survey prompt: "Should cities be allowed to
seize homes and buildings for private projects as long as they benefit the public
good?"».
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cided by the Ohio Supreme Court,13 That opinion provides
additional protection to the citizens of Ohio.14 Additionally, the
decision provides a model for other state courts to follow when ad
dressing state limitations on the use of eminent domain.
I.

BACKGROUND

Examining the legal history on the public use doctrine reveals
the cases of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit 15 in
the Supreme Court of Michigan and two prior U.S. Supreme Court
cases-Berman v. Parker 16 in 1954, and Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff7 in 1984. These cases, called the "trifecta" of the public
use doctrine,18 assured regulatory bodies that they could take pri
vate property for any number of purposes, creating a daunting hur
dle for opponents of eminent-domain takings. Together, the
trifecta created a presumption that when government entities take
property, they do so for a public use, thereby creating a fait accom
pli for the acquisition and disposition of the private property even
when there is no actual public use. 19
Kelo v. City of New London was thought to be distinguishable,
not only because of the manner in which the city would use the
property, but also because of the legal concerns about the integrity
of taking private property for private purposes, such as "economic
development," with remote, speculative, or indirect public uses. 20
The question presented was whether taking for "economic develop
ment" purposes alone withstands the constitutional scrutiny of the
13. City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-0hio-3799, 853 N.E.2d
1115.
14. Prior to the court's decision in Norwood, the Ohio legislature imposed a tem
porary moratorium on eminent domain takings for economic development. See infra
note 44.
15. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
16. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
17. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
18. Adam Mossoff, The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and
Urban Development after County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 837,
840.
19. The court creates this presumption by deferring to the legislature whenever
there is any rationale for the taking because the taking would serve a public purpose.
See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422-23 (1992)
(following Berman and Midkiff and applying rational basis review to an Interstate
Commerce Commission conclusion that a taking served a public purpose).
20. See Scott Bullock, Narrow 'Public Use', NAT'L L.l., Aug. 16,2004, at 2 (on file
with Western New England Law Review).
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Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 21
The outcome mattered because if private property could be
taken for economic development, the meaning of property owner
ship had changed, raising the question whether home and business
owners merely temporarily own property that they thought they
permanently owned. Any further erosion of property rights might
mean that a family's or individual's quiet enjoyment of their prop
erty had come to an end. In 2000, my greatest hope as a public
interest attorney was that the judiciary would critically review emi
nent domain and place real limits on its widespread abuse in light of
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 22 I wondered
whether Kelo v. City of New London would become a line in the
sand protecting the property rights of businesses and homeowners.
With odds stacked against them, the Kelo plaintiffs brought
suit in state court.23 They did this in the shadow of the trifecta and
the disturbing national and local confiscation trends, recognizing
that most homeowners and businesses cave in under eminent-do
main pressures. Overcoming the daunting feeling of a fait accom
pli, the petitioners courageously fought to keep their property.24
The Connecticut trial court found that it was unreasonable for
the City to take some of the properties and issued a permanent in
junction as to those properties,zs As to the other properties, the
court did not find legal grounds for a permanent injunction prevent
ing their condemnation,26 but did find that there were enough un
settled legal issues to justify a temporary injunction during the
appeaL27 Both parties appealed and' the Connecticut Supreme
Court ruled that all of the properties could be taken by eminent
21. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto III), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. Kelo v. City of New London (Keto /), No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS
789 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.
2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
24. See BERLINER, supra note 4, at 5. "For many people, the first time they hear
the term 'eminent domain' is when they hear that someone is planning a shopping mall
or condominium project and the location being talked about sounds suspiciously like
their home." Id. The difficulty that individuals and businesses face if they choose to
fight an eminent domain taking is daunting because there are far fewer public interest
attorneys handling eminent domain cases compared to the number of private attorneys
willing to represent owners in "just compensation" cases. Id.
25. Keto I, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *265. The plaintiffs' properties were
in two different development parcels, 3 and 4A. Id. at *7. The court determined that
the takings in parcel 4A were unreasonable and therefore dismissed the pending con
demnation action. Id. at *265, *341.
26. Id. at *323-24.
27. Id. at *323-38.
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domain. 28 The plaintiffs sought review by the United States Su
preme Court, asking: "What protection does the Fifth Amend
ment's public use requirement provide for individuals whose
property is being condemned, not to eliminate slums or blight, but
for the sole purpose of 'economic development' that will perhaps
increase tax revenues and improve the local economy?"29 In a five
to four decision,3° the Supreme Court failed to give the right answer
to this important constitutional question.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT DUCKS A SIMPLE AND IMPORTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

Did the taking of Petitioners' properties violate the public use
limitation in the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?31 In the Na
tional Institute for Urban Entrepreneurship's amici curiae brief32
on behalf of the Petitioners, amici argued that eliminating the pub
lic-use limitation is contrary to the intent of the Constitution's
Framers. Property-rights advocates called upon the Supreme Court
28. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 843 A.2d 500, 574 (Conn. 2004), affd,
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
29. Brief of Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo III), 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005) (No. 04-108), at i.
30. Kelo III, 125 S. Ct. at 2655, 2658, 2665.
31. See generally CASTLE COALITION, INST. FOR JUSTICE, Kelo v. City of New
London: What it Means and the Need for Real Eminent Domain Reform 1 (2005)
[hereinafter REAL EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM], available at http://www.castlecoalition
.0rg/pdflKelo-White_Paper.pdf ("The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states,
'[n]or shall private property be takeri for public use, without just compensation.' Yet in
the Kelo decision, Justice [John Paul] Stevens explains that the fact that property is
taken from one person and immediately given to another does not 'diminish[ ] the pub
lic character of the taking.' The fact that the area where the homes sit will be leased to
a private developer at $1 per year for 99 years thus, according to the Court, has no
relevance to whether the taking was for 'public use.' Instead, the Kelo decision imposes
an essentially subjective test for whether a particular condemnation is for a public or
private use: Courts are to examine whether the governing body was motivated by a
desire to benefit a private party or concern for the public. Thus, because the New
London city officials intended that the plan would benefit the city in the form of higher
taxes and more jobs, the homes could be taken.").
32. Brief of Amici Curiae, Better Gov't Ass'n et al. in Support of Petitioners, at
3-4, Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo III), 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108). This
brief was prepared by the Better Government Association, the Citizen Advocacy
Center, the DKT Liberty Project, NIUE, and the Office of the Community Lawyer.
NIUE became involved because both the destruction of urban small businesses and the
targeting of minority neighborhoods evident in "economic development" takings was
antithetical to NIUE's mission. See id. at 2-3. While NIUE promotes economic devel
opment, it was quite concerned with the historical misuse of the tool of economic devel
opment to clear away unwanted people, styles of housing, and smaller enterprises and
homes. This lack of inclusion in planning may have a deleterious effect on wealth build
ing for some populations of persons of color. See id.
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to revitalize the public-use limitation by holding that economic de
velopment alone is not a "public use" under the Fifth Amendment.
Furthermore, amici argued that the decisions in Berman v. Parker
and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff "address[ed] extreme
facts and d[id] not authorize takings for economic development
alone, despite the unduly broad reading given them by local author
ities and some courtS."33 The summary of the argument is as
follows:
In creating our nation, the Founding Fathers sought to en
sure protection of the citizenry's right to own property, some
thing that the English sovereign had refused to do. Among the
measures taken to protect these rights was the Fifth Amend
ment's limitation on takings of private property for "public use"
alone. This Court has long appreciated the importance of that
limitation, making the Takings Clause the first provision of the
Bill of Rights to be applied to the states through the operation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Modern social science has con
firmed that the sanctity of property ownership is well justified,
uncovering a host of hidden negative effects accompanying tak
ings of private property on the health of the community, small
businesses, and individuals.
Recently, however, local authorities have attacked the right
of property ownership by engaging in widespread takings for the
"public benefit" of "economic development." In contrast to the
words of the Framers, i.e., "public use," authorities justify these
takings by reference to speculative, often illusory, indirect public
benefits of higher tax revenues and more jobs. These anticipated
benefits, however, often are never realized, and almost always
are counterbalanced by the hidden costs to the community asso
ciated with such takings. In addition, "economic development" is
so broad a justification that it invites the wealthy and powerful to
appropriate the eminent domain power for their own advantage
and can be called upon to authorize takings of almost any land at
any time, from anyone, inviting abuse by local authorities.
Courts often uphold these takings because they read this
Court's precedent as writing the Public Use limitation out of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Such an interpretation
is incorrect on the face of that precedent, i.e., Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,467
U.S. 229 (1984) .... [E]liminating the Public Use limitation is
directly contrary to the intent of the Framers. As such, this
Court must revitalize the Public Use limitation by holding that
33.

Id. at 4.

128

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:121

economic development alone is not a "public use" under the
Fifth Amendment. 34

The majority in Kelo rejected the requests of Susette Kelo and
eight other petitioners to save their homes and businesses from the
bulldozer. Although not surprising that the judiciary might be re
luctant to overturn a legislative decision or to reverse a state su
preme court holding, it was disappointing and disturbing. Contrary
to the reaction of some lawyers opining on the case,35 my colleagues
and I were astonished that the Supreme Court would actually duck
answering the constitutional question before it. Without answering
the constitutional question, the Supreme Court deferred the matter
to the states.
The Supreme Court held that since the City's plan for the Fort
Trumbull area "unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings
challenged here satisfies the public use requirement of the Fifth
Amendment."36 The Court explained that the City could not use
eminent domain to take land for the benefit of a particular private
party, but that it could take land as part of a "'carefully considered'
development plan" so long as "the City's development plan was not
adopted 'to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals'"
and the project served a public use. 37 Rather than define "public
use" to mean use by the public, the Court construed the phrase so
broadly that the phrase "public use" became synonymous with
"public purpose."38 The Court stressed that the City's determina
tions regarding its economic-development needs were entitled to
deference. 39 Additionally, where a city has a comprehensive plan
to promote economic development, as New London did in Kelo,
any challenges must be weighed against the entire comprehensive
plan, not isolated parts. 40 Finally, the Court dismissed both the pro
posal for a "bright-line rule that economic development does not
34. Id. at 3-4.
35. See, e.g., The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private
Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo 106 (2005) (testi
mony of Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia
Univ. Law Sch.), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdfJ109hrg/
24723.pdf.
36. Kelo V. City of New London (Kelo III), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
37. Id. at 2661-62 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984».
38. Id. at 2662-63 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. V. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158
64 (1896».
39. /d. at 2664.
40. Id. at 2665.
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qualify as a public use"41 and the suggestion that if takings for eco
nomic development were to be permitted, courts "should require a
'reasonable certainty' that the expected public benefits will actually
accrue."42
In a poignant white paper prepared for the Institute of Justice,
Dana Berliner, one of the petitioners' attorneys, summed up the
Supreme Court's decision in Kelo:
The Court ruled that 15 homes in the Fort Trumbull water
front neighborhood of New London, Connecticut, could be con
demned for "economic development." There was no claim that
the area was blighted. The project called for a luxury hotel, up
scale condominiums, and office buildings to replace the homes
and small businesses that had been there. The new development
project would supposedly bring more tax revenue, jobs, and gen
eral economic wealth to the city ....
So, according to the Supreme Court, cities can take property
to give to a private developer with no idea what will go there and
no guarantee of any public benefit.43

A scary thought indeed.

III.

THE AFTERMATH OF KELO WAS

No

SURPRISE

Kelo created uproars in local, state, and federal legislatures,
the federal executive branch, and some state judiciaries. Con
cerned citizens contacted their legislators to discuss eminent do
main in their communities. Meanwhile, governmental and
nongovernmental entities involved in the taking of properties
through eminent domain were now in the position of reacting to the
changed public opinion and some takings were stalled by moratori
ums. 44 Individuals who were unaware that property could be taken
41. [d. at 2665-66.
42. Id. at 2667-68.
43. REAL EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM, supra note 31, at 1-2.
44. See, e.g., S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005), available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillTextl26/126_SB_167_CY.pdf (placing a state
wide moratorium through December 2006 on eminent domain for economic develop
ment purposes). The bill was signed into law by the governor on November 16, 2005.
Ohio Legislative Servo Comm'n, Senate Bill-Status Report of Legislation, 126th Gen.
Assemb., http://lsc.state.oh.us/coderev/sen126.nsf/Senate+Bill+Number/0167?Open
Document (last visited Dec. 30,2006); see also Diane Plattner, Creve Coeur City Coun
cil Approves Freeze on Some Eminent Domain Use, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH, Dec. 2,
2005, at D7, available at 2005 WLNR 19445347 (Westlaw) (discussing imposing a city
wide moratorium on the use of eminent domain for private development).
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for economic-development reasons or to raise the tax base were
surprised, appalled, and saddened by the decision. A level of com
munity concern and public policy re-thinking, never seen before on
the topic of eminent domain, caused a tidal wave of legislation, bal
lot initiatives, media inquiry, and community petitions in jurisdic
tions across the country.45 Additionally, the judiciary in at least one
state, Ohio, has fought back against the Kelo decision's erosion of
property rights. 46
A.

Why the Uproar?

As the U.S. Supreme Court was reading into the Constitution
the words "public purpose,"47 property rights advocates stared at
the words "public use." The Supreme Court rejected a strict inter
pretation of the term, as though asking property rights advocates to
avert their eyes. 48 The distinction has extraordinary legal implica
tions for anyone involved in future eminent-domain actions. The
federal courts' modest deference to legislatures and state court
opinions signaled to the populace and opponents of eminent-do
main abuse that the state and local legislatures and courts were
proper venues to consider these important questions.
Regardless of the Supreme Court's decision, it still seemed un
American and against public policy to justify the taking of private
property that would be given to another private party to increase
the tax base. This unpopular decision has significant human, social,
and economic ramifications. Ironically, a case that could have
stood for hope to recognize the dream of business and horne owner
ship instead stands as a harbinger of the death of property rights as
we know them.
The human cost of eminent domain is real and needs to be
quantified. Those who empathized with Susette Kelo and other pe
titioners, including the Derys and the Cristofaros, could only imag
ine the profound pain they experienced personally and privately
throughout this ordea1. 49 Advocates of increased compensation do
45. See CASTLE COALITION, INST. FOR JUSTICE, LEGISLATIVE ACTION SINCE Kelo
(2006) [hereinafter ACTION SINCE Kelo], available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdfl
publications/State-Summary-Publication.pdf.
46. See infra Part IV.
47. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo III), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005).
48. Id. at 2661-62.
49. "'There's been an explosion of outrage by people across the country and
across the political spectrum about what can be done,' says Scott Bullock of the Insti
tute of Justice" and, contra, "Donald Borut, executive director of the National League
of Cities, says .... 'We all feel sympathetic for someone who is losing a home,' .... 'But
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not quite understand that many times it is not about the money.
Sometimes, staying in one's home is a personal desire connected to
conceptions of love, dignity, and respect. Other times, it is about
the wish that the community's current racial, ethnic, and cultural
diversity will be welcomed and included in the new, gentrified com
munity. Though the Supreme Court did not weigh these in
tangibles, they were key to the settlements between the City of New
London and Ms. Kelo, the Derys, and the Cristofaros that occurred
within a year of the Court's decision. 50
On a societal level, the Supreme Court's failure to honor the
Fifth Amendment is a blow to social and economic justice. The de
cision suggests that the federal judiciary is no longer the place for
homeowners, small businesses, and other property owners to seek
protection. Instead, individuals would have to seek change at the
local and state level and in other branches of the federal
government. 51
B.

The Federal Executive and Legislative Response to Kelo v.
City of New London

After Kelo, two of the hottest words in Washington were "emi
nent domain."52 Members of Congress introduced a number of
proposals to address the Kelo ruling.53 On June 23, 2006, the one
year anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, President
we also have to consider the faces of people of all income levels who benefit from the
job creation these projects bring.'" Dennis Cauchon, States Eye Land Seizure Limits:
Bills Would Rein in Eminent Domain, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2006, at lA, available at
2006 WLNR 3750021 (Westlaw).
50. Scott Bullock, A Long Road: Susette Kelo Lost Her Rights, But She Will Keep
Her Home, LIBERTY & L., Aug. 2006, at 1, 10, available at http://www.ij.org/pdCfolder/
liberty/15_8_06.pdf (summarizing the human toll and settlements in the aftermath of
Kelo). Wilhelmina Dery passed away in March of 2006 in her home and her husband,
Charles Dery, agreed to a settlement. Id. at 10. The Cristofaro family has an exclusive
right to purchase, at a fixed price, one of the homes to be built in Fort Trumbull. Id.
"Margherita Cristofaro, who passed away while the battle against eminent domain
abuse occurred in New London," will be memorialized in a plaque that will be installed
in Fort Trumbull. Id. "The City also has agreed to move the trees that father Pasquale
Cristofaro transplanted 30 years ago ...." ld. Ms. Kelo's settlement was the accept
ance of a proposal she presented years before, to keep her pink home and move it to a
new neighborhood. ld. at 1.
51. Tresa Baldas, States Ride Post-'Kelo' Wave of Legislation, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2,
2005, available at http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=1122899714395.
52. See, e.g., Margie Hyslop, State Lawmakers Join Eminent Domain Fight,
MONTGOMERY COUNTY GAZETTE (Gaithersburg, Md.), Aug. 16, 2005, available at
http://gazette.netlgazette_archive/2005b/200532/montgomerycty/state/288539-1.html.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 58-64.
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George W. Bush issued an executive order to restrict the seizure of
private property solely to benefit private interests. 54 White House
spokeswoman Dana Perino stated that" '[t]he federal government
is going to limit its own use of eminent domain so that it won't be
used for purely economic development purposes.' "55 The policy set
out in the Executive Order permits the federal government to take
property "for the purpose of benefiting the general public," but not
for "the purpose of advancing the economic interest of private par
ties to be given ownership or use of the property taken."56 Al
though the Executive Order only limits takings by the federal
government, it offers a clear rejection of the Supreme Court's
choice to apply the meaning of the broader phrase "public purpose"
to the constitutional phrase "public use."
By the time President Bush issued his executive order, mem
bers of Congress had been responding to Kelo for a year. 57 In the
Senate, several bills intended to protect property owners from tak
ings for economic-development purposes were introduced. 58 Sena
tor Christopher "Kit" Bond responded to Kelo by offering an
amendment59 to the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent
54. Exec. Order No. 13,406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,973 (June 28,2006).
55. Jeremy Pelofsky, Bush Moves to Limit US Gov't Taking Private Land,
REUTERS NEWS, June 23, 2006 (quoting White House Spokeswoman Dana Perino),
available at LEXIS (Reuters News database).
56. Exec. Order No. 13,406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,973 (June 28, 2006).
57. See Castle Coalition, Inst. for Justice, Current Proposed Federal Legislation
on Eminent Domain, http://www.castiecoalition.org/legislationlfederal/index.html (last
visited Dec. 30, 2006) (up-to-date listing of congressional actions in response to Kelo).
58. See, e.g., Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of
2005, S. 1313, 109th Congo (2005) (stating that when federal funds are used, "the power
of eminent domain shall be available only for public use," and that "[t]he term 'public
use' shall not be construed to include economic development"); Private Property Rights
Protection Act of 2005, S. 1704, 109th Congo (prohibiting the use of federal funds for
eminent domain takings for economic development); Empowering More Property
Owners with Enhanced Rights Act of 2005, S. 1883, 109th Congo (creating Office of the
Property Rights Ombudsperson and establishing a program to enhance the rights of,
and provide advocates for, private property owners, small businesses, and family farm
ers affected by federal and federally assisted programs). S. 1313 was referred to the
Judiciary Committee on June 27, 2005. 151 CONGo REc. S7429 (daily ed. June 27, 2005).
In June of 2006, the measure had 31 co-sponsors in the Senate. 152 CONGo REC. S6449
(daily ed. June 23, 2006). S. 1704 was referred to the Judiciary Committee on Septem
ber 14, 2005. 151 CONGo REC. S10,046 (daily ed. Sept. 14,2005). S. 1883 was introduced
and referred to the Committee on the Environment and Public Works on October 18,
2005. 151 CONGo REc. Sl1,479 (daily ed. Oct. 18,2005).
59. 151 CONGo REc. Sl1,591 (daily ed. Oct. 19,2005) (adding language permitting
states and cities to use federal funds for projects that involve the exercise of eminent
domain for a public use and barring the use of federal funds for any economic develop
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Agencies Appropriations Act for the 2006 fiscal year ending Sep
tember 30, 2006. 60 Senator Bond's amendment was added to the
act, eventually becoming law. 61 Under the amendment, states and
cities are allowed to use funds authorized by the Act for projects
that involve the exercise of eminent domain for a public use, so
long as the funds are not used for economic-development projects
that primarily benefit private entities. 62
In addition to passing this bill, the U.S. House of Representa
tives considered a number of other bills and resolutions. 63 Just a
week after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kelo, the
House approved a resolution expressing disagreement with the ma
jority opinion in Kelo. 64 As in the Senate, much of the legislation
introduced in the House sought to limit the use of eminent domain
by cutting off federal funding for projects involving economic de
ment project that primarily benefits private entities, proclaiming that such projects are
not for a public use).
60. Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary,
the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, H.R.
3058, 109th Congo (2005) (as enrolled).
61. Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary,
the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-115, 119 Stat. 2396 (2005).
62. Id. at 100-01.
63. See, e.g., Private Property Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3135, 109th Congo
(2005) (as introduced by the House, June 30, 2005) (prohibiting the use of economic
development based eminent domain in any projects receiving federal funds and prohib
iting the federal government from exercising eminent domain for economic develop
ment); H.R. 3315, 109th Congo (2005) (as introduced by the House, July 14, 2005)
(withholding community block grant funding from any locality where eminent domain
may be exercised for commercial or economic-development purposes in such a way that
taken property is transferred to a third party); Strengthening the Ownership of Private
Property Act of 2005, H.R. 3405, 109th Congo (2005) (as introduced by the House, July
22,2005) ("A Bill [t]o prohibit the provision of Federal economic development assis
tance for any State or locality that uses the power of eminent domain power to obtain
property for private commercial development or that fails to pay relocation costs to
persons displaced by use of the power of eminent domain for economic development
purposes."); Protect Our Homes Act of 2005, H.R. 4088, 109th Congo (2005) (as intro
duced by the House, Oct. 19, 2005) (imposing limits on the use of eminent domain for
purposes of economic development); H.R. Res. 340, 109th Congo (2005) (as adopted in
the House, June 30, 2005) (expressing disagreement with the majority opinion in Keto
and stating that "eminent domain should never be used to advantage one private party
over another"); H.R.J. Res. 60, 109th Congo (2005) (as introduced in the House, July 14,
2005) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution: '''Neither a state nor the United
States may take private property for the purpose of transferring possession of, or con
trol over, that property to another private person, except for a public conveyance or
transportation project.' ").
64. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Congo (2005). Passed by the House on June 30, 2005,
with 365 yays to 33 nays, with 18 answering "present," and 17 not voting. 151 CONGo
REc. H5593 (daily ed. June 30, 2005).
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velopment. Although no blanket prohibitions on Federal funding
for projects involving eminent-domain takings for economic devel
opment have yet been adopted, the incorporation of Senator
Bond's amendment to the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and
Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Inde
pendent Agencies Appropriations Act for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2006, indicates that many members of Congress do
not want federal funds used for eminent domain takings that prima
rily benefit private parties.
C.

The State and Local Response to Kelo v. City of New
London

A plethora of bills were introduced before and enacted by state
legislatures across the country after Kelo. 65 Immediately following
the United States Supreme Court's 2005 Kelo decision, "legislatures
in 28 states have introduced more than 70 bills aimed at curbing
local eminent domain powers, and legislators in five states have
proposed constitutional amendments to prohibit eminent domain
for private development."66 In a span of just fourteen months fol
lowing the decision, thirty states successfully enacted new eminent
domain reform legislation. 67 Prior to Kelo, eight states-Arkansas,
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana, South Caro
lina, and Washington-had legislation forbidding the use of emi
nent domain for economic development purposes, except in cases
involving blighted properties. 68 Three states-Alaska, Illinois, and
Texas-have since enacted additional legislation further limiting
the use of eminent domain. 69 In addition, legislators in six states
65. See Castle Coalition, Inst. for Justice, State Legislative Actions, http://maps
.castlecoalition.org/legislation.html (last visited Dec. 30,2006) (giving an up-to-date list
ing of state actions in response to Kelo).
66. Carla T. Main, How Eminent Domain Ran Amok, POL'y REV., Oct. & Nov.
2005, at 23, available at http://www.policyreview.org/oct05/main.html (citing data from a
National Law Journal article from August 1, 2005 [sic]; see Baldas, supra note 51).
67. See AcnON SINCE Kelo, supra note 45, at 1.
68. CCIM INST., USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: RE
AcnON TO Kelo by State Legislatures 3 (2006), available at http://www.ccim.com/mem
bers/govaffairs/pdf/EminenCDomain.pdf.
69. See H.B. 318, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006) (as enrolled) (prohibiting the
use of eminent domain for economic development purposes and prohibiting the use of
eminent domain to acquire a landowner's primary residence for the use of an indoor or
outdoor recreation facility or project); Press Release, Castle Coalition, Inst. for Justice,
Alaska Enacts Eminent Domain Reform (July 6, 2006), available at http://www.castle
coalition.org/media/releasesl7_6_06pr.html (reporting that Alaska's Governor signed
House Bill 318 into law on July 5, 2006 "in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's June
2005 decision in Kelo"); Equity in Eminent Domain Act, Ill. Pub. L. No. 094-1055
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Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, and South
Carolina-approved constitutional amendments to restrict the use
of eminent domain, which have received voter approval.7° In Ari
zona, Iowa, and New Mexico, governors vetoed eminent domain
reform passed by the legislatureJl In Iowa, the legislature over
rode the governor's veto to enact legislation that requires the gov
ernment to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a property
is blighted, or is in an area where 75 percent of property is blighted,
before a property can be taken through condemnation. 72 Eighteen
states have not enacted any form of eminent-domain reform follow
(2006), available at http://www.ilga.govllegislation/publicacts/94fPDF/094-1055.pdf (im
posing significant restrictions on the use of eminent domain); S.B. 7B, 79th Leg., 2d
Sess. (Tex. 2005) (as enrolled) (restricting government or private entity from taking
private property for primarily economic-development purposes, if purpose is pretex
tual, or if the taking confers a private benefit); 2005 TEX. SEN. J., 79th Leg. 2d Sess. 129
(daily ed. Aug. 19,2005) (signed into law on Sept. 1,2005); see also Castle Coalition,
Inst. for Justice, Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, http://www.castlecoalition.org/
legislation/passed/index.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2006) (discussion of state-enacted
legislation following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London
(Kelo 11/), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005».
70. AcnON SINCE Kelo, supra note 45, at 2; see also Press Release, Castle Coali
tion, Inst. for Justice, 2006 Election Wrap Up (Nov. 8, 2006), available at http://www
.castlecoalition.org/media/releases/ll_8_06pr.html; Castle Coalition, Inst. for Justice,
2006 Ballot Measures [hereinafter 2006 Ballot Measures], http://www.castlecoalition
.orgllegislationlballot-measures/index.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2006); cf id. (discussion
of states that have passed legislation, based on citizen-initiatives, rather than legislator
initiatives, through ballot measures, including the state of Arizona).
71. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Governor, State of Ariz., to Jim Weiers,
Speaker of the H., Ariz. H.R. (June 6, 2006), available at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/
govlettr/47Ieg/2R1HB2675.pdf (Governor's explanation of her veto of H.B. 2675, which
would have limited local control over redevelopment projects to regulate the use of
eminent domain); 2006 IOWA SEN. J., 2006 Reg. Sess., 81st Gen. Assemb. 1764 (proof
May 3, 2006) (printing Governor's veto message for H.F. 2351, which would have al
tered the state's condemnation powers and essentially prohibited the use of eminent
domain for economic-development purposes); H.B. 746, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M.
2006), available at http://legis.state.nm.us/lcs/_session.asp?chamber=H&type=++&
number=746&Submit=Search&year=06 (last visited Dec. 30,2006) (prohibiting the use
of eminent domain to promote private or commercial development and the transfer of
title to a private entity). Although the New Mexico legislature passed House Bill 746,
Governor Richardson vetoed it, and called for a task force to examine eminent domain.
Press Release, Castle Coalition, Inst. for Justice Legal Expert Testifies Before New
Mexico Eminent Domain Task Forced [sic] (Aug. 11, 2006), available at http://www.
castIecoalition.org/media/releases/8_11_06pr .html.
72. 2006 IOWA SEN. J., 2006 Reg. Sess., 81st Gen. Assem. (proof July 14,2006)
(overriding Governor's veto of H.F. 2351, which altered the state's condemnation pow
ers and essentially prohibited the use of eminent domain for economic development
purposes); AcrION SINCE Kelo, supra note 45, at 6; see also Press Release, Iowa Legis
lature Overrides Eminent Domain Reform Veto (July 14, 2006), available at http://www
.castlecoalition.org/mediaireleasesl7_14_06pr .html.
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ing Kelo, and of those states, three did not have legislative sessions
in 2006.73
Advocates of eminent domain reform should be careful in re
viewing the legislation being proposed. State legislative amend
ments can address three aspects of the eminent-domain issue: (i)
substantive restrictions on takings; (ii) procedural restrictions on
the manner of taking; and (iii) compensation following a taking. 74
Advocates of private-property rights recommend legislation that
"will genuinely protect citizens from losing their land to other pri
vate parties for private development."75 Obviously, neither increas
ing the amount of compensation due in takings cases nor imposing
procedural restrictions will truly protect citizens. Therefore, reform
efforts should focus on placing substantive restrictions on takings.
Recommendations include removing statutory authorizations for
the use of eminent domain in private commercial development, de
fining "blight" specifically, or requiring that the property be essen
tial for the specific project.76 The most effective legislative reforms
are those that redefine blight because "[m]ost abuses of eminent
domain for private use occur because a state's definitions of blight
are too broad or vague, applicable to practically every neighbor
hood in the country."77 Of the thirty states that have enacted emi
nent-domain reform, fourteen narrowed the definition of "blight,"
making it difficult to classify a property as blighted, unless the prop
erty endangers public health or safety.7 8 The other sixteen states
enacted legislation providing some restrictions on the use of emi
nent domain for private development. 79
Local governments around the country also took action follow
ing Kelo. 8o For example, just three days after Kelo was decided,
73. ACTION SINCE Keto, supra note 45, at 1.
74. Dwight H. Merriam, Presentation at the District 1 Conference of the Ass'n of
Real Estate License Law Officials: Kelo v. New London, The Decision ... and the
Aftermath, 67-68 (June 26, 2006) (on file with Western New England Law Review).
75. REAL EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM, supra note 31, at 6.
76. Id. "Additional useful provisions [include having] blight designations expire
after a certain number of years[, giving] owners the opportunity to rehabilitate property
before it can be condemned[, and r]eturn[ing] property to former owners if it is not
used for the purpose for which it was condemned." Id. at 7.
77. ACTION SINCE Keto, supra note 45, at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Castle Coalition, Inst. for Justice, Current Proposed Local Legislation on
Eminent Domain [hereinafter "Current Proposed Local Legislation on Eminent Do
main"], http://www.castiecoalition.orgilegislationilocal/index.html (last visited Dec. 30,
2006) (providing an up-to-date listing of proposed local legislation responding to Keto).
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county supervisors in San Diego, California, ordered an immediate
review of the county's eminent-domain policies. 81 In some cases,
the local government's response was mostly symbolic, providing lit
tle or no additional protection for homeowners.82 A number of lo
calities, however, took action to prevent the specific type of
eminent domain abuse at issue in Keto-the taking of private prop
erty for private development. 83 Other local efforts defined "public
use" more narrowly than the Supreme Court, insisting that land be
taken only for those projects actually available for the public's
use. 84
In addition, citizens are taking action. 85 For example, "[o]n
81. County May Limit Eminent Domain, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 20, 2005,
at B2, available at http://www.signonSandiego.com/news/metro/20050nO-9999-7m20
briefs.htm!.
82. See, e.g., Bill Johnson, Forsyth Commissioners Won't Take Land: Eminent Do
main Ruled Out for Now, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 11,2005, at JH9, available at 2005
WLNR 12618175 (Westlaw) ("[T]he Forsyth County Commission unanimously passed a
resolution that pledge[d] the current board [would] not" use eminent domain for eco
nomic development purposes. "The resolution, however, [was] not binding on future
governing bodies.").
83. See, e.g., Plattner, supra note 44 (discussing a moratorium that Creve Coeur
officials placed on the use of eminent domain for private development in November
2005); Current Proposed Local Legislation on Eminent Domain, supra note 80 (citing
Sarah Thorson, Q.c. Council Shuns Eminent Domain Use, EAST VALLEY TRIB., Oct.
10,2005) (discussing the fact that, in July, the Queen Creek town council approved, by
unanimous vote, a resolution that prohibited the condemnation of private property for
economic-development purposes); Rindi White, Wasilla Bans Taking Private Land for
Private Use, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2005, at G4, available at 2005 WLNR
17729180 (Westlaw) (discussing the fact that the Anchorage Assembly unanimously
voted to approve an ordinance that would prohibit the city from using eminent domain
to benefit private developers).
84. Current Proposed Local Legislation on Eminent Domain, supra note 80 (cit
ing Leslie Boyd, Woodfin Decides to Restrict Eminent Domain, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN
TIMES (Asheville, N.C.), Aug. 17,2005, at 1B (reporting that the Woodfin Board of
Aldermen approved by unanimous vote, a "resolution ... stat[ing] that the board be
lieves the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Kelo vs. New London uses an 'overly
broad definition' of public good." Moreover, the resolution "stat[ed] the town will not
employ eminent domain outside of a true 'public use' context."»; Eric Stirgus, South
siders Vow: Hands Off; 2 Counties Opt to Limit Land Grabs, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July
21, 2005, at 1C, available at 2005 WLNR 11418650 (Westlaw) ("Coweta and Henry
county commissioners voted ... to use the power of eminent domain solely for public
purposes, such as building roads, fire stations, schools or libraries. ").
85. See Castle Coalition, Inst. for Justice, Success Stories, http://castlecoalition
.org/success/index.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2006) (providing a listing of local actions
that have successfully prevented eminent domain takings). In addition to tracking emi
nent domain reform, the Castle Coalition, a project of the Institute for Justice, created
an Eminent Domain Abuse Survival Guide to assist citizen-activists across the country.
CASTLE COALITION, INST. FOR JUSTICE, EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE SURVIVAL GUIDE:
GRASSROOTS STRATEGIES FOR WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST EMINENT DOMAIN
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September 1, 2005, voters approved a referendum blocking Putnam
[Connecticut] from using eminent domain to acquire private prop
erty for private economic-development purposes."86 In November
2005, voters in Bogota, New Jersey, passed an ordinance-by a vote
of 1,408 to 293-prohibiting the mayor and borough council from
using eminent domain to condemn private property for private de
velopmentP Voters have also led efforts to get eminent domain
reform questions on ballots. 88
IV.

THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE TO KELO

At the same time as the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo en
couraged state and local legislators to impose additional limitations
on the use of eminent domain, the Court suggested that some state
constitutions and statutes might already provide greater protection
than the U.S. Constitution. 89 Believing this to be the case, the Na
tional Institute for Urban Entrepreneurship joined the NAACP
Ohio Conference in filing an amicus brief in the Ohio case of City
of Norwood v. Horney.90 In our amicus brief, we argued that: "The
Burden of Eminent Domain Takings Fall Disproportionately Upon
Racial And Ethnic Minorities and the Economically Disadvan
taged" and "Redevelopment of Non-Blighted, 'Deteriorating'
Neighborhoods Is Not a Public Use."91
City of Norwood involved a plan by the City of Norwood to
take private residences through eminent domain and turn the
properties over to a private developer for a large, mixed-use devel
opment.92 Following an "urban renewal" study, the city labeled the
ABUSE, available at http://castlecoalition.orglpdf/publications/survival-guide.pdf (last
visited Dec. 30, 2006).
86. Current Proposed Local Legislation on Eminent Domain, supra note 80 (cit
ing Voters Approve Limits on Eminent Domain, NEWSDAY.COM, Sept. 2, 2005).
87. Current Proposed Local Legislation on Eminent Domain, supra note 80 (cit
ing Brian Aberback, Municipal Results; Bogota, THE RECORD, Nov. 9,2005, at L-4).
88. See, e.g., Poll: Hands Off Private Land: Majority Banks Limits on Eminent
Domain, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Oct. 28, 2005, at Bl, available at http://www.review
journal.com/lvrLhome/2005/0ct-28-Fri-2005/news/4036616.html.
89. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo III), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
90. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Ohio Conf. of the NAACP and the Nat'l Inst. for
Urban Entrepreneurship in Support of Appellants, City of Norwood v. Horney, City of
Norwood v. Gamble, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (2006) (Nos. 05-1210, 05
1211).
91. Id. at 2-17.
92. City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-0hio-3799, 853 N.E.2d
1115, at 'll'll 8, 17-18. By the time the town took action to condemn the properties at
issue in this case, the private developer had successfully acquired most of the other
property required for the development. [d. at 'll'll 19-21.
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neighborhood a "deteriorating area."93 Thereafter, the city, in ac
cordance with its ordinances, commenced actions to take the
properties at issue in the case. 94
The trial court concluded that while the city's urban renewal
study was flawed, it was sufficient for the city to determine that the
area was "deteriorating."95 Both the trial court and the appeals
court refused to issue orders preventing the appropriation of the
properties while the property owners appealed the trial court's de
cision. 96 However, the Ohio Supreme Court did issue orders
preventing the alteration or destruction of the properties pending
the outcome of the appea1. 97
On July 26, 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to uphold
the two eminent domain actions, resurrecting property rights as citi
zens knew them prior to Kelo. 98 Writing for the Ohio Supreme
Court, Justice Maureen O'Connor reversed the lower court, holding
in part that "although economic factors may be considered in deter
mining whether private property may be appropriated, the fact that
the appropriation would provide an economic benefit to the gov
ernment and community, standing alone, does not satisfy the pub
lic-use requirement of Section 19, Article 1 of the Ohio
Constitution."99 A pleasant surprise indeed.
The court went on to apply "heightened scrutiny when review
ing statutes that regulate the use of eminent-domain powers."lOO
The court also rejected the use of "deteriorating area" as a standard
for determining whether private property is subject to appropria
tion, saying it was void for vagueness and inherently speculative.1 01
Furthermore, the court severed from the statute, as unconstitu
tional, a provision that prohibited a court from preventing the tak
ing and use of property appropriated by a government after
compensation for the property had been deposited with the court,
but prior to appellate review. 102
Public interest attorneys concerned about the rampant takings
across the country were elated that the Ohio Supreme Court criti
Id. at 'lI 22.
Id. 'lI 22, nA.
Id. at 'lI 25.
Id. at 'lI 31.
Id.
See id. at 'lI'lI 9-11.
99. Id. at 'lI 9.
100. Id. at 'lI'lI 10,66-74.
101. Id. at 'lI'lI 88-104.
102. Id. at 'lI 11.
93.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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cally reviewed and decisively rejected provisions of this particular
eminent domain statute. Ironically, the judiciary may yet be the
branch that restores new life to the principle that constitutional lim
its do exist with respect to eminent domain. State courts that criti
cally review state constitutions have struck the power balance
between the proper use of eminent domain and protection of pri
vate property ownership. Hopefully, state high courts will embrace
this opportunity to resurrect, at the state level, the constitutional
protections tossed out by the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

Eminent domain has real, tangible, and adverse effects on en
trepreneurs, small businesses, homeowners, and other property
owners. The U.S. Supreme Court was presumed to be a place
where those victimized by eminent domain abuse could find refuge.
However, in Kelo v. City of New London, the U.S. Supreme Court
was very clear: go to the legislature. Therefore, people have sought
redress from their legislatures and other local venues, including
state courts, to correct the misguided approach to eminent domain
present across the country after the Kelo decision.
We heed the recommendation by the Supreme Court when it
explained, "We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes
any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the tak
ings power."103 The Supreme Court has indeed opened many eyes
to an area of law that desperately needed reform; public interest
lawyers are sure to respond.

103.

Kelo v. City of New London (Ke/o Ill), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).

